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Executive Summary 
 
How and whether judges should be held accountable is a key issue in the design of a legal 
system.  Thirty-seven of the forty-eight continental United states use some method of judicial 
selection which involves a direct role for citizens in selecting or re-appointing the judiciary.   
 
We identify two theoretical reasons why the method used for choosing judges is 
important – (i) a selection effect if the competence or underlying preferences of judges is 
affected, (ii) an incentive effect if the judges who are chosen behave differently because of the 
method used for their re-appointment.   
 
The paper uses data from the U.S. to investigate whether judicial selection methods affect 
the number of employment discrimination charges filed for the period 1973- 2000.    Our results 
show that states that appoint their judges have lower levels of discrimination charges compared 
to those that use some form of election.  The results appear to be driven by states where judges 
being subject to re-election incentives rather than because judges with different 
preferences/competences are being chosen. 
 
Our results should be viewed in the light of the burgeoning empirical literature on the 
importance of judicial independence in affecting economic outcomes.  La Porta et al (2003) 
argue persuasively that countries with greater judicial independence are also those with better 
economic and political outcomes.  Traditionally, the main threat to judicial independence comes 
from the executive branch of government (see Glaeser and Shleifer (2002)).  Our results are 
consistent with the view that appointing judges strengthens the independence of the judiciary as 
argued, for example, by Posner (1993).    
 
But there are three main (competing) notions of judicial independence at work here -- 
independence from executive authority in government, from popular opinion and from organized 
interests such as big-business.  Electing judges may create greater independence from 
government and from the influence of big business.  However, it may create less independence 
from popular opinion. Whether this is welfare improving is moot.  Our results are consistent with 
the view that appointing judges (especially to life terms) protect the property rights of firm 
owners who might otherwise be expropriated by populist courts.  Yet, it may also perpetuate 
discrimination in labor markets.   
   3 
I.  Introduction 
 
How and whether judges should be held accountable is a key issue in the design of a legal 
system.  It is also one on which the states in the United States have historically adopted different 
policies.  Thirty-seven of the forty-eight continental states use some method of judicial selection 
which involves a direct role for citizens in selecting or re-appointing the judiciary.  But whether 
such institutional differences affect the way in which laws are implemented and enforced is 
moot.   
 
There are two main theoretical reasons why the method used for choosing judges can 
affect outcomes. The first is a selection effect if the competence or underlying preferences of 
judges is affected.  The second is an incentive effect if the judges who are selected behave 
differently in the face of the method that is used for their re-appointment.  
 
This paper uses U.S. state level data to investigate whether judicial selection methods 
affect the number of employment discrimination charges filed for the period 1973- 2000.  Such 
charges are an interesting source of evidence since the judiciary has played a key role in policy 
implementation in this area.  Although a charge of discrimination may be resolved at the agency 
level, the courts are the venues of last resort for an employee or employer.  Because both trial 
and appellate courts interpret statutes, judges are involved in creating policy.  Court decisions 
potentially expand or contract a given statute insofar as any given decision involves a court’s 
application of the statute to a particular set of facts.  These statutory interpretations are binding 
decisions not only on the parties to the agreement but to future litigants.   
 
Even though the vast majority of such claims are settled outside the court, there are 
strong grounds to expect that the generosity of settlements reached in court will affect the 
decision to file since collectively the judiciary can change the thrust of policy towards those who 
perceive discrimination.  It is therefore plausible to expect that judicial accountability will have 
an effect on the decision to file a charge.   
 
  Our results show that states that appoint their judges have lower levels of discrimination 
charges compared to those that use some form of election.  This result holds for aggregate 
discrimination charges and for charges in four sub-categories (race, gender, age and disability).  
We also instrument for whether a state uses judicial appointments using other similar institutions 
(whether a state permits popular initiatives and referendums, and whether the state elects its 
public utility commissioners).  Finally, we consider whether the results are driven by incentive or 
selection effects.  Here we find evidence that it is submitting judges to re-election which matters 
rather than the mode of initial appointment.   
 
These results can be interpreted in view of concerns about institutions that guarantee 
judicial independence (see LaPorta et al (2002)).  Our results suggest that re-election incentives 
may compromise judicial independence by increasing the weight that they attach to the interests 
of employees.  This finding is amplified by our auxiliary observation that states with judges who 
serve life terms have even fewer discrimination charges filed. 
   4 
There is an existing body of work supporting the view that appointed judges behave 
differently compared to elected judges. Suggestively, Bohn and Inman (1996) find that whether a 
constitutional restriction on deficit finance is effective depends on whether the court that has to 
enforce the restriction is elected or appointed. Restrictions with appointed courts do not appear 
effective in their data. Hanssen (2000) tests the idea that appointment leads to greater judicial 
independence by looking at staffing levels in three budgetary agencies that are subject to judicial 
review: public utility commissions, insurance commissions and education bureaucracies. He 
argues that the kind of defensive activity that more independent judiciaries engage in will result 
in them having more staff. Using cross-sectional data for 1983, he shows that states with elected 
judges have significantly smaller bureaucracies controlling for a number of other observables. 
Hanssen (1999) looks at whether states that elect their judges have more or less litigation 
activity, arguing that this may reflect the degree of uncertainty in the operation of courts. Using 
data from all 50 states, he tests whether there are significantly more public utility disputes (1978-
83), and High Court and Trial Court Filings (1985-94) in states that elect their judges. The main 
finding, identified from cross-sectional differences, after controlling for a number of economic 
and demographic variables, is that appointing states have significantly higher rates of judicial 
activity in public utility disputes and High Court Filings, but not in Trial Court Filings.
1 
 
Our analysis makes three main advances over previous studies.  First, our outcome – 
employment discrimination charges – is particularly suited to the study of the effects of judicial 
selection procedures on outcomes.  The broad base of the evidence (across five categories of 
discrimination), the fact that charges can only be brought by one type of party (employees), and 
the relatively long time-period makes systematic testing a possibility.  Second, our method for 
investigating robustness to endogeneity of judicial appointment regimes is novel.  Third, our 
paper tries to see which of the two principal reasons – selection or incentives is driving the 
results. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we discuss some 
background facts and the institutional setting.  Section III discusses background theoretical 
considerations which motivate our test.  Section IV discusses data and the empirical estimation 
strategy while section V develops the results.  Conclusions and directions for future research are 
in section VI. 
 
II. Institutional Background 
 
This section provides the background institutional details and information needed to 
comprehend the econometric evidence presented below. 
 
A.  The Role of Courts in Interpreting State Laws 
For a matter to be heard by a state court, the state must prohibit the type of alleged 
discrimination in a statute or in its constitution.
2  If the state prohibits employment 
                                                 
1 This is part of a larger body of  literature which looks at the impact of cross-state differences in institutions on 
policy outcomes reviewed in Besley and Case (2003).    Besley and Coate (2003) reviews the literature on elected 
versus appointed regulators and uses panel data on electricity prices across U.S. states to argue that elected states 
adopt more pro-consumer policies. 
2  A description of these state laws is provided in the next section.     5 
discrimination an individual is potentially covered by state and federal law.  The federal law will 
serve as an umbrella statute for many types of discriminatory behavior if the state statute 
provides broader coverage than the federal statute. To pursue a claim of discrimination, the 
individual must first file a charge of discrimination with the state or federal agency responsible 
for overseeing claims of discrimination.  At that point the charge may be resolved by the agency 
(e.g. through an investigation, mediation, or agency action) or the individual may decide to drop 
his claim.  If the matter is not resolved or dropped, the individual will have the option of bringing 
a court action in the appropriate state trial court.
3  A trial court is considered to be a court where 
the judge and/or jury are a “trier of fact.”  As the trier of fact, the trial court, after hearing the 
evidence presented by the employee and employer, will decide whether an employer unlawfully 
discriminated against the employee based on its interpretation of how the facts fit the law upon 
which the claim of discrimination is based.  If the losing party is dissatisfied with the decision of 
the trial court, that party can only appeal the decision if the party disagrees with the court’s 
interpretation of the law.  Thus, the courts that oversee the actions taken by the trial courts are 
known as appellate courts.  These courts can reverse the findings of a trial court only if the trial 
court erred in its interpretation of the law.  Appellate courts do not have the authority to re-try a 
case and these courts cannot re-interpret the facts of the case.   
 
In some states there is only one level of appellate courts.  In other states there are two 
levels.  In the instance where there is only one level of appellate courts, once that court has 
rendered its decision, there is no further recourse for the parties in the state court system.  In the 
instance where there are two levels of appellate courts, then a decision made at the lowest 
appellate level can be appealed to the highest appellate court.  In most states, the second level of 
appellate court (often called the state “Supreme Court”) has some discretion over the matters 
which it will agree to hear.  Thus, an aggrieved party that failed to win at the first level of 




The path an aggrieved employee will follow through the court system is illustrated in 
Figure 1. The first step begins with an employee or a job applicant deciding that he has been 
discriminated against by an employer.  In the case of an employee, this could stem from the 
employee not getting a promotion or salary raise, being demoted, or being forced to retire or 
resign.  Once the alleged discrimination occurs, the employee (or job applicant) has to decide 
whether to file a charge of employment discrimination with the federal Equal Employment 
Opportunities Commission (“EEOC”) or relevant state agency within a fixed period.  In states 
for which there is no state law against the particular type of discrimination, the charge must be 
filed within 180 days of the date on which the alleged discrimination occurred.  In states for 
which there is a state law against the particular type of discrimination, the charge must be filed 
within 300 days of the date of the alleged discrimination.   
 
Once a charge is filed with one agency (federal or state), to avoid unnecessary 
duplication of efforts, it is common practice for that agency (e.g. federal) to notify the other 
                                                 
3 Alternatively, the individual could bring an action in federal court.  In most instances, the state law will apply first 
with the federal law providing protection when the state law is not applicable. 
4 For a more comprehensive review of state judicial process, see Carp and Stidham (2001).  For an overview of the 
issues concerning judicial selection, see Hall (2001).    6 
agency (e.g. state) of the charge under a work sharing agreement between the two agencies.  This 
way, the employee is protected under both the federal and state laws. The government agency 
then is required to contact the employer and to seek conciliation between the employee and 
employer.
5  At the agency level, there are several possible resolutions, three of which are 
described as follows.  First, the agency can dismiss the charge if the employee has failed to 
provide the necessary information to support his claim of discrimination.  Second, the agency 
can investigate the matter and decide whether to issue a “right to sue” letter.  At this point, the 
agency may encourage the parties, through mediation or some other process, to settle the matter.  
Third, the agency can decide to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the employee against the employer 
for the alleged discrimination.   
 
Although the agency may be involved in investigating the alleged discrimination, the 
actions of the agency are not binding on the parties.  Depending on the type of alleged 
discrimination (age, race, sex, disability, etc), after a certain period has passed, regardless of the 
actions (or inaction) the agency has taken, the employee may ask the agency for a right to sue 
letter and move the matter into the judicial system.  Only in the case where the agency has 




B.  Judicial Selection 
 
Legislation and constitutional requirements regarding the selection of judges have relied, 
historically, very little on particular characteristics an individual may possess.  There are very 
few qualifications an individual has to meet to be a judge.  Moreover, there is no prescribed 
training program for would-be judges.  Most judges have been older white males (Carp and 
Stidham, 2000, p. 269).  The average starting age of a state trial judge is 46 and the average 
starting age of a state appellate judge is 53.  The political party affiliation of a state judge tends 
to mirror the party that dominates in the judge’s state.    Despite the method used to select the 
judges, a majority of state judges were politically active before assuming the bench.   
 
At the federal level, all judges are appointed and serve for life.  At the state level, judges 
may be appointed, elected, or selected using a combination of appointment and election.  In 
addition, in all but a few states (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island), judges serve 
a limited term and must be re-selected to serve additional terms.  The methods used to select 
judges, in general, have followed four historic phases.  With the founding of the United States, 
judges were initially selected through some type of appointment by either the state legislature or 
the governor.  In the 1820s, during the period of Jacksonian Democracy, many states switched 
their selection scheme to one that involved a partisan election.  By 1860, 24 of the 34 states in 
existence selected their judges under this method.   
 
At the end of the 19
th century, during the Progressive Era, many states switched to a non-
partisan election of judges.  There was a concern that a partisan election led to judges having an 
                                                 
5 With respect to age discrimination, the state agency has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter for the first 60 days.  
After that, however, the matter may be handled by either the state agency or the EEOC. 
6 One of the benefits associated with having the agency initiate a lawsuit on behalf of the employee is that the 
employee is not responsible for retaining or paying fees of the lawyer that is needed to pursue the lawsuit.   7 
increased involvement in their political party in order to win an election.  During this period 
there was a perception that many judges were corrupt and incompetent.  Thus at the time, the 
role of non-partisan elections was to “take judicial selection out of politics,” while still giving 
voters a say in who should be a judge.   
 
In the early to mid-1900s, there were heated debates over judicial selection with some 
arguing that what was needed was a combination of appointment and election scheme to select 
judges.  This type of method was first adopted by Missouri in 1940 whereby a judge was first 
appointed by a governor after he consulted with a nominating commission comprised of lawyers 
and non-lawyers.  For subsequent terms, however, the judge would have to withstand a retention 
election whereby voters could decide in a yes/no vote whether to keep the judge in office.
7  Thus, 
while the judge does not have to run against another candidate to retain his office, he is subject to 
the whims of the voters in terms of whether he will be retained.  
 
Today, there is quite a bit of variation in the selection methods used by states.
8  Most 
states use the same selection method for trial and appellate court judges.
9  We have grouped the 
states into three categories: appointed, elected, and hybrid.  An appointed state is one that uses 
only appointment as the means of selecting and retaining judges.  The appointment may or may 
not include the use of a nominating commission and is by the governor or the state legislature.  
An elected state is one that uses elections to select and retain judges.  These elections may be 
partisan or non-partisan elections.  A hybrid state is one that directs the governor to select a 
judge by appointment but then shortly thereafter (usually within two years of the initial 
appointment) the judge must be retained through a retention election. 
 
Table 1 reports the distribution of states by the current selection method for the judges 
serving in the highest level appellate court under these three types of selection methods.   
Twenty-two states elect their judges, 11 states appoint their judges, and 15 states use the hybrid 
method of first appointing the judge and then using a retention election for subsequent terms.  
Interestingly, there is regional variation in judge selection.  Most of the states in the eastern 
region of the U.S. appoint their judges, whereas most of the states in the mid-west and southern 
regions of the U.S. elect their judges.  The states in the western regions of the U.S. either elect or 
use the hybrid method of judge selection.   
 
Column (4) in Table 1 identifies those states which have changed their judicial selection 
methods between 1970 and 2000.
10  Although many states have tried to change their selection 
method over the last 30 years, very few have succeeded.  In most states the selection method is 
dictated by the state’s constitution and to change the constitution requires approval by the state 
                                                 
7 This method of selection is also referred to as a “merit” selection plan.  It is termed merit because the initial 
appointment is by the governor in consultation with a nominating committee.  Throughout the paper, however, we 
use the term “hybrid” instead of merit.  In part this is due to the fact that some states are considered “merit” plan 
even if the appointment method is used for subsequent terms of a judge because the appointment is done in 
conjunction with a nominating commission.  We have chosen to treat these types of states as “appointed” states. 
8 See Bowers (2002) for a more complete history of judicial selection methods. 
9 As of 2000, the following states use a different selection method for some or all of the trial court judges: Arizona, 
California, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, North Carolina, and South Dakota. 
10 For a more comprehensive description of selection methods and the history of state changes in these methods, see 
www.ajs.org.    8 
legislature, governor, and the voters.  Since 1970, there have been substantial changes in the 
methodology used to select the judges for the highest court in 18 states.  The most prevalent 
change was from a non-partisan election method to a hybrid method.  Wyoming (1972), Arizona 
(1974), South Dakota (1980), and Florida (1983) enacted this type of change.  The next most 
prevalent change was from a partisan election method to a non-partisan election method.  Florida 
(1972), Louisiana (1974), Massachusetts (1975), Mississippi (1994), and Arkansas (2000) 
enacted this type of change.  Indiana (1970) and Tennessee (1994) switched from a partisan 
election method to a hybrid method.  New York (1977) switched from a partisan election method 
to an appointment method (with a nominating commission).  A handful of states, Maryland 
(1974), Vermont (1974), Delaware (1977), New York (1977), Wisconsin (1983), South Carolina 
(1996), added a nominating commission to its existing selection method.  Delaware (1977) added 
a nominating commission to its existing governor appointment.  Rhode Island (1994) switched 
from a method that appointed a judge via legislative election to an appointment by the governor 
in consultation with a nominating commission.  New Mexico added to its partisan election 
method a retention election for judges seeking additional terms. 
 
C. Employment Discrimination Statutes 
 
Most employees are covered by several federal statutes that prohibit employment 
discrimination based on such things as race, color, sex, age, national origin, religion, and 
disability.  With the exception of the statute concerning disabilities, the federal statutes were first 
enacted in the mid- to late 1960s.
11  The statute covering disabilities was first enacted in 1990 
and became effective in 1992.
12  The agency responsible for enforcing these laws is the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).  Prior to 1972, however, the EEOC was 
considered a “toothless tiger” because it did not possess sufficient enforcement power to pursue 
violators of the federal statutes.  EEOC’s authority was expanded in the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission Act of 1972.  Initially, the EEOC was not responsible for overseeing 
charges of age discrimination.  This changed in 1980 when authority over the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act was given to the EEOC.
13 
 
In addition to the federal statutes, many states have enacted statutes that are similar to the 
federal statutes.  The state statutes, however, often are more broadly worded and cover more 
types of employers and/or employees.  For example, in some states age discrimination applies to 
all individuals over the age of 18, whereas the federal statute only covers individuals over the 
age of 40.  In some states, discrimination is prohibited for such things as marital status, sexual 
orientation, smoking, having a family history of certain diseases, and/or participating in political 
activities outside of the workplace.  Most of the federal statutes require the EEOC to defer 
                                                 
11 The significant pieces of federal legislation are: The Equal Pay Act (enacted in 1963; requires equal pay for equal 
work), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (enacted in 1964; makes it illegal to discriminate in hiring, discharge, 
compensation, etc., on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin), the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (enacted in 1967; makes it illegal to discriminate against individuals over the age of 40 unless age 
is considered a bona fide occupational qualification). 
12 Enacted in 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act requires employers to offer reasonable accommodation to 
disabled employees and bans discrimination against the disabled in wage determination, hiring, and firing. 
13 For a more detailed report on the role played by the EEOC in pursuing charges of discrimination and the federal 
laws covering, see www.eeoc.gov.     9 
charges it receives to the state agencies so that the agencies can first try to resolve the disputes 
using state laws, thereby treating the federal law as a “law of last resort.”
14 
 
Although the state statutes reflect federal laws, there is variation when they were first 
enacted.  In some states, the statutes were enacted before the federal laws were enacted, in other 
states, the statutes were enacted subsequent to the federal laws.  A few states still do not have a 
statute that prohibits employment discrimination in the private sector.    
 
Table 2 reports the years in which prohibition of discrimination was first enacted on the 
basis of race, sex, age, or disability.  This table does not reflect modifications to the statutes that 
occurred subsequently for such things as: marital status, sexual harassment, sexual orientation, 
mandatory retirement, and/or mental disability.  With respect to prohibitions of race and sex 
discrimination, states in the southern part of the U.S. tended to be the last states to enact 
legislation.  Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi still do not have a statute for these types of 
discrimination.  With respect to prohibitions of age discrimination, states in the middle part of 
the U.S. in addition to some southern states were the last states to enact legislation.  With respect 
to the prohibition of discrimination with respect to disability, there is no clear-cut geographic 
distribution across the states. 
 
 
III.  Theoretical Considerations 
  
We are interested in understanding the decision to file charges in the state s at date t as a 
function of the judicial institutions in place in that state.  We will use a simple model in which 
we suppose that the judicial institutions affect the likelihood that a court will favor an employee 
if a charge is litigated.    
  
Consider an employee i who lives in state s at date t and believes that she has been 
discriminated against by her employer and is, therefore, entitled to damages under the law.   
Suppose that these damages depend upon two components: 
 
ist ist ist z d + = µ       ( 1 )     
 
where µist is some feature of the case known to the employer and the employee and zist is a 
component which depends upon judicial discretion and is uncertain.  
  
While the exact level of zist is uncertain, we suppose that in expectation it depends upon 
the judicial institutions in the state labeled as θ st.  This includes whether the state elects or 
appoints its judges, whether there is a hybrid plan, etc. For simplicity suppose that θ st can take on 
only one of two values: election (e) and appointment (a). Let F(z; θ st) be the cdf for damages.  
Note that θ st depends on both the incentives of the particular judge involved in the case, but also 
the body of precedent that has been created by past judgments that are relevant.  Thus it makes 
                                                 
14 Information regarding the relationship between the EEOC and state agencies and the role of state laws in 
resolving disputes can be found at www.eeoc.gov.    10 
sense to view it as something which is specific to the state as much as it is relevant to the 
particular judge in question. 
 
The process of choice can either affect the type of judges that are in office or their 
incentives once appointed.   
 
Selection:  If judges are selected by politicians rather than citizens, this could affect the types of 
judges who are appointed.  This could operate along a competence or an ideological dimension.  
One view is that the citizens are likely to be poorly informed about the qualities of judges and 
hence any system involving election will likely lead to a less competent judiciary.  The 
ideological stance of judges based on the method of selection may also differ.  The issue 
bundling theory suggests that running separate elections for different offices can change the 
pattern of ideological representation by unbundling the issues on which elected representatives 
decide.
15  Elections in representative democracies determine a multitude of policy outcomes.  
Not all policy issues are likely to be salient to voters.  Distortions away from median outcomes 
on these issues due to lobbying or preferences of political elites are not corrected by the electoral 
process.  Applied in the current context, this argument suggests that the policy preferences of the 
judiciary need not coincide with those of the electorate at large for the issues on which they sit in 
judgment.  For example, the influence of big business might lead to more pro-employer 
sentiments among the judiciary when they are appointed by elected politicians.  If judges are 
elected, there is more scope for popular opinion to influence the political complexion of the 
judiciary making it less beholden to employer interests.  We would expect this effect to 
encourage a judiciary that is more pro-worker in its outlook.   
  
Incentives: Electing judges can also make a difference because it encourages them to reach 
judgments that appeal to voters at large -- appointed judges who are up for re-appointment need 
only please politicians, creating an insulating layer between judges and the public.  Popular 
election may therefore encourage judges to pander to popular opinion.  This idea is developed 
formally in Maskin and Tirole (2002). Suppose that there are two kinds of judges: those whose 
views are congruent with the public at large and those who are not. Suppose also that there are 
components of the decision to be made in court that are not observed by the voters at large. In 
particular, there could be some conditions for which it is reasonable to deny the compensation 
claim. We suppose, however, that voters attach more weight to the economic conditions being 
conducive to compensation being paid. Voters prefer judges who share their preference and 
make a decision on whether to retain judges based on observing their judgments. Pandering 
occurs when judges are inclined to ignore their private information and go with the opinion of 
voters, thereby awarding compensation when none is warranted.
16 
  
Whether because of selection or incentive effects, both of these arguments lead us to 
expect that damages awarded will be higher in systems that elect their judges, i.e., F(z; a) > F(z; 
e) for all z. We now explore the implications of this assumption.  
  
                                                 
15 This line of argument is developed in Besley and Coate (2000, 2003).  
16 Of course the unbundling argument is also important in affecting incentives since judges running for re-election 
should be judge solely on their performance as judges and not as part of the general competence of the government 
in power.   11 
Suppose that the employer is better informed about the circumstances of the 
discrimination case. In fact, we take an extreme version of this and suppose that he is fully 
informed. We now consider a pre-trial procedure in which the employee makes a (take-it-or-
leave-it) offer, denoted by y to the employer.
17 The employer then accepts or rejects. If he 
rejects, then the case goes to trial, while if he accepts, then the case is settled out of court. The 
employer will accept the offer if his payoff from litigating exceeds the value of the negotiated 
settlement on offer. Suppose that the employee faces costs of c for going to court while the 
employer faces costs of C. Thus, the employer will accept an offer of y if and only if y < (z +C).  
  
To determine the optimal pre-trial offer, note that the payoff to the employee from 




− + − −
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At an interior solution, the value of y that maximizes this is characterized by:  
 
0 ) : * ( ) ( ) : * ( 1 = − + − − − st st C y f c C C y F θ θ  (3)    
 
From this, it is immediate that y is decreasing function of (C + c).  There is no clear-cut 
prediction about the effect of judicial institutions on the decision to settle -- this depends on how 
the hazard function for damages changes with θ st.  In the special case where zst =θ st+ est, then it is 
straightforward to check that the probability that a case is litigated does not depend on θ st.  Thus, 
we would not expect the judicial institutions to affect the rate of litigation in this case.  
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be the expected payoff from filing a charge. Whether a charge is worth filing now depends on 
whether this exceeds the cost of filing.  Thus, if the cost to employee i in state s at time t is kist, 
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It is now easy to see that electing judges will lead to more charges being filed (other 
things being equal) as it increases the left hand side of this inequality.  Thus, even though there is 
no clear-cut prediction on the probability that a case is litigated or settled, there is an 
unambiguous prediction in terms of the decision to file.  It is this observation that motivates our 
empirical test.   
 
                                                 
17 This asymmetric information model follows Bebchuk (1984).  The basic thrust of our argument would also hold in 
the well-known model of Priest and Klein (1997) where potential litigants are symmetrically informed, but uncertain 
about the outcome from litigating.   12 
IV.  Data  
 
The empirical analysis studies the effect of the judicial selection method on the number 
of charges of employment discrimination brought in a state (to either a state or federal agency).  
Studying the selection issue using employment discrimination charges is ideal for several 
reasons.  First, initiating a charge is one-sided.  Only an employee (or potential employee) may 
file a charge.  Thus, our analysis is not confounded by the possibility of an employer (the other 
party with different interests) bringing a charge.  Second, given the existence of the federal 
statutes prohibiting the key types of employment discrimination (race, sex, age, disability), the 
role played by the state statutes are likely to minimized.
18  As such, our analysis is able to 
concentrate on the role played by the method used to select judges and is not as confounded by 
the intricacies of the state statutes as might exist with another type of court action. 
 
We obtained under the Freedom of Information Act data on all employment charges filed 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) since 1970; the charges 
concerning claims of age discrimination start in 1980.
19  The EEOC receives approximately 
80,000 charges on alleged employment discrimination practices by private employers per year.
20  
Approximately 39 percent of all charges are given priority investigative and settlement efforts 
due to the early recognition that discrimination has likely occurred.  Approximately 57 percent of 
all charges require further investigation to determine if a violation has occurred.  The remaining 
charges are dropped due to jurisdictional limitations or unsupported claims of discrimination.  
 
Of total EEOC charges in 2001, 36 percent involved claims of race-based discrimination, 
31 percent involved claims of sex-based discrimination, 20 percent involved claims of age-based 
discrimination, and 20 percent involved claims of disability-based discrimination.
21 Across these 
different categories, approximately 18 to 26 percent of the charges were closed without further 
action because of reasons related to the employee not following up on the charge, there not being 
any statutory jurisdiction for the claim, or because the employee withdrew the charge (which 
may or may not include private settlements between the employee and employer reached early in 
the charge process).  For approximately 55 to 63 percent of the charges, the EEOC failed to find 
a reasonable cause to support the claim of discrimination. If the EEOC fails to find a reasonable 
                                                 
18 As revealed by Collins (2001), with respect to race, 98 percent of non-southern blacks were already covered by 
the state laws well before the adoption of the federal law.   As such, in many instances the existence of the state laws 
well before our analysis also limits the impact of the laws on our analysis.  Collins (2001) as well as Neumark and 
Stock (2001), however, do find modest impacts of these laws on the employment of blacks and women. 
19 EEOC’s role with respect to age discrimination has changed over time.  Initially, the Department of Labor 
maintained administrative responsibility for investigating claims pertaining to age discrimination.  In 1979, the 
EEOC was given this responsibility. Given the state agencies and the EEOC communicate with each other 
concerning the filing of charges, the data we have from the EEOC reflect the pool of employees who are concerned 
enough about an employment practice to bring it to the attention of the government agency.  Thus, we do not have 
data on alleged acts of discrimination that are not brought to the attention of a state or federal agency.  Given that 
approximately 20 percent of all charges filed with the EEOC are closed because of reasons related to the employee 
not following up on the charge, there not being any statutory jurisdiction for the claim, or because the employee 
withdrew the charge, we think this is not a serious concern. 
20 Information on the charge and litigation statistics can be found at www.eeoc.gov.  
21 For any given charge, one may claim several types of employment discrimination.  While we do not study them, 
there can also be claims of discrimination based on religion or national origin as well as claims of discrimination 
based on the Equal Pay Act.   13 
cause, however, this does not preclude the employee from bringing a private court action.  The 
remaining charges are settled quickly, go through some sort of conciliation process, and/or have 
a finding by the EEOC that there is a reasonable cause to support the alleged discrimination.   
 
In rare cases, the EEOC files a lawsuit on behalf of an employee.  In 2001, for example, 
only 32 age discrimination lawsuits (less than 10%) were initiated directly by the EEOC.
22  The 
majority of lawsuits initiated by the EEOC are filed for claims concerning race or sex-based 




The data from the EEOC contains much information on each charge filed.  Each record 
identifies the office in which the charge was filed, the basis for the alleged discrimination, 
characteristics of the employee, characteristics of the employer, and information on the actions 
taken by the EEOC (or related state agency) on the charge.  Two datasets were provided to us.  
The first dataset covers the early years (up to 1988).  The second dataset covers the period from 
1988 to 2001.  The first dataset provides information on the first three actions taken in the case.  
The second dataset provides information on the first five actions taken in the case.   
 
To construct the data set that we use, we identified those charges that involved a claim of 
age discrimination, race discrimination because the employee was black, sex discrimination 
because the employee was female, and/or discrimination based on one’s disability.  We excluded 
those charge records for which the record was closed because it was a duplicate record.  We then 
summed the number of charges filed per year in each state over the sample period.   
 
We will study five categories of charges: (1) all charges (1973-2000), (2) charges with a 
claim of race discrimination by a black individual (1973-2000), (3) charges with a claim of sex 
discrimination by a female (1973-2000), (4) charges with a claim of age discrimination (1980-
2000), and (5) charges with a claim of disability discrimination (1993-2000).    
 
Table 3 reports the summary statistics of the EEOC charge data.  In the first four rows, 
we report the overall mean number of charges per year per state, the standard deviation, the mean 
number of charges per 100,000 population, and the number of observations, respectively.  In 
column (1), we report the summary statistics across all states.  In columns (2) to (4), we report 
the summary statistics based on the method of judicial selection.  Overall, 2274 charges or 43 
charges per 100,000 population are filed per year per state.  Across the three selection methods, 
the lowest number of charges are filed in states in which the judges are appointed.  On average, 
there are 1444 charges or 32 charges per 100,000 population filed in these states. There is 
                                                 
22 In general, EEOC initiated lawsuits represent big actions.  For example, in 2000, the EEOC settled a class action 
suit for $300,000 of an age bias lawsuit against Enterprise Rent-A-Car in Texas. The lawsuit alleged that the 
company refused to hire individuals 40 years of age or older for management trainee positions.  Also in 2000, EEOC 
agreed to an $8 million settlement of an age discrimination case against AlliedSignal of Arizona on behalf of 48 
charging parties and approximately 300 class members. The lawsuit alleged that the company violated the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) when it laid off older workers at its Tempe and Phoenix facilities in 
1993 and 1994. 
23 Presumably, a state agency could also pursue a lawsuit on behalf of the employee.  Whether the state agencies 
possess this ability, however, is determined at the state level.  Information on the role the state agency plays beyond 
possessing powers similar to the EEOC to investigate charges, however, is difficult to obtain for all of the states.   14 
minimal difference in the number of charges filed in the elect and hybrid states.  On average, 
there are between 2469 and 2599 charges per year filed in these two types of selection states. 
 
Rows (7) to (30) of Table 3 report the summary statistics for the four specific claims of 
discrimination that we are studying.  Note that for any given charge, an individual may assert 
more than one type of discrimination.  For example, a black woman may assert a claim of 
discrimination based on race and sex.  With the exception of a claim of discrimination based on 
one’s disability, the fewest charges are filed in states in which the judges are appointed.  For 
claims of discrimination based on one’s disability, the average number of charges is lowest in the 
appointed states if we do not adjust for the population size.  After adjusting for the population of 
a state, however, there is little difference across the three types of states. 
 
Table 3 reveals that most of the charges involve a claim of racial discrimination.  Most of 
these charges are from the states with a higher proportion of blacks in the population.  The 
charges come primarily from the mid-atlantic, mid-western and southern regions of the United 
States.  If we divide the states into two groups, one with an above median proportion of blacks in 
the population and one with a below median proportion of blacks in the population, the 
distribution of charges across the three types of judicial selection states is somewhat similar.  For 
both groups, the fewest number of charges are filed in states in which the judges are appointed.  
In the states with an above median proportion of blacks, the highest number of charges are filed 
in the elected states.  In the states with a below median proportion of blacks, the highest number 
of charges are filed in the hybrid states.   
 
If the employee does not gain a favorable settlement, he must decide whether to pursue a 
lawsuit against the employer in either state or federal court.
24  States vary in the statutes that 
govern discrimination.  Thus, we created a series of indicator variables that capture differences in 
state laws.  We use three dummy variables denoting whether the state statute covers race 
discrimination, age discrimination, and disability discrimination, respectively.
25  We also 
generate indicator variables that identify three types of change in the state statutes.  We have one 
variable that equals one if there was a change (in the past three years) in the state statute, making 
it easier for an employee to initiate a charge of discrimination. This would include, for example, 
extending the period in which an employee may file a charge and allowing for certain types of 
damages awarded to an employee.  We also use a dummy variable which equals one if the state 
eliminates mandatory retirement for most employees in the private sector.  This is a change in 
the statute that directly affects older workers, but also affects other types of workers because it 
expands the workforce by giving workers the right to work beyond the expected retirement age.  
Finally, we created a dummy variable which equals one if the state statute is broad enough to 
protect employees for such things as being a smoker, participating in legal activities outside of 
work, and having certain genetic characteristics.  Potentially, as employment discrimination laws 
are amended to protect more employees, the effectiveness of the laws are weakened. 
                                                 
24If there is a state statute prohibiting age discrimination, the employee must decide whether to pursue his rights in 
state court or federal court.  In most instances, the state statute is broader than the federal statute and so the 
employee is likely to pursue an action in state court.  The employee and the employer, however, under limited 
circumstances may pursue the action in federal court.  The federal court may apply state or federal law, depending 
on the nature of its jurisdiction over the lawsuit. 
25 We do not have a dummy variable for gender discrimination because during the sample period, since if a state has 
a statute prohibiting race discrimination it usually also prohibits sex discrimination.     15 
 
The state level economic, and demographic measures reflect time-varying measures that 
could affect the conditions under which an employee may decide to pursue a charge of 
employment discrimination.  For the economic measures we use the real per capita income (base 
year 1996), the unemployment rate and data on the structure of employment, specifically the 
proportion of employment in the service sector, financial sector and manufacturing.
26  For the 
demographic measures we use state population, the percentage of the state population between 
ages of 45 and 59, 60 and 64, and 65 and older, and the percentage of the state population that is 
black.




Our basic results are generated by the following specification:   
 
st st st st rt st S X A C ε π θ β λ + + + + =     ( 6 )     
 
where C is the total number of charges filed by individuals located in state s in year t per 1,000 
population, λ  is a set of region-year dummy variables, A is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the state appoints its judges to the highest level of appellate courts, X is a set of exogenous state 
level economic, and demographic measures, S is a set of measures identifying the types of state 
laws that prohibit employment discrimination, and ε  is the residual.  We allow the residuals to be 
clustered at the state level. 
 
Since we have region specific year dummies, identification must come either from states 
that switch their method of appointment during our time period or from within region variation.  
In the case of appointment, this boils down to cross-sectional variation within two regions – the 
mid-Atlantic  region and the southern region (regions 2 and 5 in Table 1).   
 
We report results first for total charges filed (Table 5).  We then consider the 
disaggregated charges for age (Table 6), race (Table 7), gender (Table 8) and disability (Table 9).  
For each set of charges we report five different specifications.  In column (1), we consider a 
specification which controls only for state level economic and demographic variables.  In column 
(2) we add controls for the discrimination statutes.  Column (3) tests the robustness of the main 
findings by adding three other potentially relevant measures of judicial institutions – whether the 
state has only one level of appellate courts, the pay of judges, and whether the judges are granted 
life terms.  Column (4) repeats the results only for the two regions that have within region 
variation for whether the state appoints it judges.
28  This is important as these regions are the 
ones from where most of the identification is coming.   
 
                                                 
26 These data come from the CPS. 
27 Note that for the year 2000, we do not have population estimates for the population between the ages of 45 and 
59, 60 and 64, and the population that is black.  As such, we use the 1999 values for 2000.   
28 We include the judicial culture measure of whether there is no second level of appellate court but exclude the 
other judicial culture measures.  We exclude the measure on the life term for the judge as only New Jersey gives 
their judges a life term in regions 2 and 5.  We exclude the measure on judge’s salaries given it is not statistically 
significant in the specification reported in column (3).   16 
Column (5) considers an instrumental variable approach for the mid-Atlantic and 
southern states.  This tries to deal with the concern that the choice of judicial institutions can be 
correlated with the error due to such as things omitted “judicial culture”.  In this context, we 
need an instrument which is correlated with the choice of judicial selection, but which we expect 
to have no direct bearing on the decision to file charges.  To this end, we suggest as the 
instrument features of the political institutions within the state such as whether the state elects its 
public utility commissioners and/or institutions of direct democracy.  The extent of democracy 
characterized this ways turns out to be negatively correlated with the probability that a state 
appoints its judges.  Since there is no good reason to think that this variable is directly related to 





Column (1) of Table 5 shows that there is negative and significant relationship between 
appointing judges and total charges per capita filed.  The effect is sizeable.  It is slightly more 
than a one-standard deviation difference and is equal to sixty percent of the mean charges filed 
across the whole sample.  Of the other regressors included only the percentage of black 
population is significant at a p-value of less than .01, suggesting that more charges are filed in 
states with larger black populations.   In addition, there are more charges filed in states with a 
higher proportion of employees in the service and financial sectors.  The economic and 
demographic controls are highly significant (F-test = 11.13, p-value =0.000).  Column (2) adds 
in the statute controls.  A change in the procedure in the past two years is negatively correlated 
with filing charges as is the presence of another group statute. After controlling for statutes, there 
is some evidence of an effect of unemployment on filing charges suggesting that workers are 
more likely to do so when it is more difficult to become re-employed.  There is also evidence 
that there are fewer charges filed in the more populated states.   
 
In column (3), we check robustness by including three other measures of judicial 
institutions – whether the state has only one level of appellate courts, whether judges serve a life 
term, and judges salaries.  There is a negative and significant effect of not having a second layer 
of appellate courts.  This is also a negative and significant effect of life terms, suggesting that 
such judges are less likely to find in favor of discrimination.
30  The size of the effect of 
appointing judges declines but the significance of the effect remains unaltered.  In column (4), 
we focus solely on the two regions that have within region variation.  The result once again holds 
up and stays similar in sign and significance.  Finally, column (5) reports two stage least squares 
results which instruments the appointment variable using whether the state appoints or elects its 
public utility commissioners and rules for direct legislation.  The result remains negative and 
significant.  
 
                                                 
29 In addition to exploring the results for only regions 2 and 5, we also excluded the three states for which there is no 
state statute prohibiting discrimination based on race.  The results when we exclude these states are similar to the 
results reported in the tables. 
30 Only four states appoint their judges for life: Massachusetts (Region 1), New Hampshire (Region 1), Rhode Island 
(Region 1), and New Jersey (Region 2).  In New Jersey, a judge is initially appointed to a term of 7 year; upon 
reappointment the judge is then given a term of life.   17 
In Table 6, we repeat the previous set of specifications for race discrimination charges.  
The pattern of results is very similar with a robust negative and significant effect of appointing 
judges on charges filed.  The effect here is larger than one standard deviation and is equal to the 
mean number of charges across states.  The results once again hold up across all specification 
including the IV specification in column (5).  There is relatively little evidence of the importance 
of statutes in affecting the rate of filing. 
 
In Table 7, we look at gender discrimination charges.  Again, the correlation with 
appointing judges is negative and significant.  The effect is approximately one standard deviation 
in the left-hand side variable and less than half the mean over the whole sample.  The results are 
again robust to the specifications used with the life term measure for judges also proving 
important (Column (3)). 
 
In Table 8, we look at age discrimination charges.  The coefficient is around 2/3rds of 
one standard deviation in the left hand side variable and around one-half the mean number of 
charges filed.  The pattern of significance in the other variables seen in Table 5 is broadly 
repeated.  Of note once again is negative and significant effect of a life-time appointment for 
judges in column (3).  In column (5), we should also note that the results do not hold once we 
instrument for appointment. 
 
Finally, in Table 9, we look at disability discrimination.  The results here are uniformly 
weaker, although the much shorter period on which they are based should be taken into 
consideration.  For all of the specifications except for column (3), the results suggest that 
appointing states have fewer charges filed, on the order of one standard deviation and less than 
one-third the mean number of charges filed.  This result does not hold up when the judicial 
culture terms are included.
31    
 
Overall, the results provide a consistent patter of evidence in favor of the proposition that 
states with appointed judges have smaller numbers of charges being filed.  This is consistent with 
our theoretical priors that judges who face some kind of popular accountability are more likely to 
be pro-employee in the decisions that they reach.  The results in columns (4) and (5) that look at 
the within region variation in columns (4) and (5) are particularly interesting and compelling 
given the source of variation and the fact that these are two relatively homogeneous groups of 
states in terms of culture and history.   
 
VII.  Selection versus Incentives 
 
We now consider whether the data can discriminate between the selection and incentive 
effects of variations in judicial accountability.  To this end, we make use of the fact that in the 
                                                 
31 One reason the results are not as strong for the claims of discrimination based on disability may be due to that fact 
that the disability legislation expects employers to make “reasonable accommodations” in addition to simply 
prohibiting discrimination based on one’s disability.  As such, given that most employment discrimination claims 
are based on an existing employee being fired or demoted  (as opposed to a potential employee not being hired), if 
the employers are not making the reasonable accommodation in the first place to hire the potential employee, the 
pool of employees who can allege that they have been unfairly treated because of their disability is very different 
from the pool of employees that may exist for other types of potential discriminatory practices. See Jolls and 
Prescott (2002) for a description of the issues pertaining to disability legislation.   18 
hybrid selection regime, judges are initially appointed, but subsequently held to account in 
retention elections.  If selection is at work, then we would expect those judges who are appointed 
initially by politicians to be different from those who are elected.  If incentive effects are at 
work, then we expect the results to show that it is judges who must be re-elected who are 
different (regardless of whether they were initially appointed or elected).
32 
 
To look at this, we create a dummy variable which is equal to one in all states that 
initially appoint their judges, whether or not they are subject to re-election.
33  Effectively, this 
amalgamates the hybrid and appointing regimes.  Table 10 reveals that this variable is not 
significant for any of the charges that we considered.  This militates against the view that the 
selection of judges by politicians in appointment regimes reflects systematically different 
preferences. 
 
We now add in a variable that identifies those states that use a retention election for the 
subsequent terms held by the judge.  The indicator variable on initial appointment is now 
negative and significant while that on the hybrid regime is positive and significant, more than 
offsetting the effect of appointment.
34  Thus judges who are re-elected by the citizens behave 
much as judges who are elected in the first place whereas judges who are only ever elected are 
behind the results.  This finding is consistent with the incentive effect being important, but not 
with the view that selection is important.   
 
Also consistent with the claim that incentives effects are paramount, we tested whether 
judges in appointing states appear to have significantly different ideologies compared to those in 
electing states.  While we did find some weak evidence that judges are actually more liberal in 
appointing states, this does not hold up to conditioning on state level economic and demographic 
characteristics.   
 
VIII: Concluding Comments 
 
This paper argues that there is a significant association between the method of judicial 
selection used within a state and the propensity to file discrimination charges.  States where 
judges are appointed see fewer charges for race, age and gender discrimination being brought.  
This suggests that courts tend to favor workers in such states.  It is most plausible to think of this 
effect stemming from the collective precedents set by judicial intervention in interpreting statutes 
rather than the incentives of each judge.  The results that we find are robust to a wide variety of 
estimation methods and choices of controls. 
 
                                                 
32 It is important to note that in states in which judges are elected, if a judge leaves office prior to the expiration of 
his term, usually the governor will appoint a successor to fill the vacancy until the next election.  Given this, the 
argument that the difference in the filing of charges due based on appoint/elect as a function of the selection effect is 
weakened if the judge who is appointed to fill the vacancy is also the judge that wins the subsequent election.  
33 In states that use election as their initial (and retention) method of selection, the governor often will appoint a 
judge before the first election if the retiring judge steps down prior to the election. 
34 The reason why judges who face a retention election encourage more charges to be filed is not clear.  It is 
consistent with the idea that there is some kind of selection effect at work which yields a difference between judges 
who are initially elected and those who face only a retention election.  The exact mechanism at work here, however, 
is not entirely clear.    19 
We discussed two main theoretical channels via which electing judges can change the 
propensity to file a discrimination charge.  The first is via the way in which judicial 
accountability affects the preferences or competences of judges (the selection effect).  The 
second considers how the incentives of judges are affected by re-election concerns.  Our results 
suggest that, in the case of judges in the U.S., the latter effect is more important. 
 
Our results should be viewed in the light of the burgeoning empirical literature on the 
importance of judicial independence in affecting economic outcomes.  La Porta et al (2003) 
argue persuasively that countries with greater judicial independence are also those with better 
economic and political outcomes.  Traditionally, the main threat to judicial independence comes 
from the executive branch of government (see Glaeser and Shleifer (2002)).  Our results are 
consistent with the view that appointing judges strengthens the independence of the judiciary as 
argued, for example, by Posner (1993).    
 
But there are three main (competing) notions of judicial independence at work here -- 
independence from executive authority in government, from popular opinion and from organized 
interests such as big-business.  Electing judges may create greater independence from 
government and from the influence of big business.  However, it may create less independence 
from popular opinion. Whether this is welfare improving is moot.  Our results are consistent with 
the view that appointing judges (especially to life terms) protect the property rights of firm 
owners who might otherwise be expropriated by populist courts.  Yet, it may also perpetuate 
discrimination in labor markets.     20 
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Figure 1: Case Resolution Process 
Settle 
No Action 
By Employee Only 
By Employee or Agency 
By Employee, 
Employer, or Agency   23 
 
 
Table 1: Current State Judicial Selection Methods (as of 2000) 
State  Appoint  Elect  Hybrid  Notes (changes since 1970) 
Region 1        
Connecticut Gov  w/Nominating 
Commission 
    
Maine Governor  Only       
Massachusetts Governor  w/Nominating 
Commission 




Governor Only w/Executive 
Council 
    Executive Council by Exeutive Order 
Rhode Island  Governor w/Nominating 
Commission 
    In 1994 method changed from 
appointment via legislative election 
Vermont Governor  w/Nominating 
Commission 
    In 1974 switched from legislative 
appointment method 
Region 2        
Delaware Governor  w/Nominating 
Commission 
    In 1977 method was changed from 
Governor only appointment by Executive 
Order 
Maryland      Yes  In 1974 method was changed from initial 
appointment by governor only to one 
requiring a nominating commission by 
Executive Order 
New Jersey  Governor Only       
New York  Governor w/Nominating 
Commission 
    In 1977 method was changed from 
Partisan Election 
Pennsylvania    Partisan Election w/Retention 
Election for Subsequent Terms 
  
Region 3        
Illinois    Partisan Election w/Retention 
Election for Subsequent Terms 
  
Indiana      Yes  In 1970 method was changed from 
partisan election 
Michigan   Non-Partisan  Election  (could 
be considered Partisan) 
  Does not list party affiliations on the balit 
but candidates are nominated at party 
conventions and run with party 
endorsements 
Ohio   Non-Partisan  Election  (could 
be considered Partisan) 
  Does not list party affiliations on the balit 
but candidates must run in partisan 
primary elections and run with party 
endorsements 
Wisconsin   Non-Partisan  Election       
Region 4        
Iowa     Yes   
Kansas     Yes   
Minnesota   Non-Partisan  Election     
Missouri     Yes   
Nebraska     Yes   
North Dakota    Non-Partisan Election     
South Dakota      Yes  In 1980 method was changed from non-
partisan election 
Region 5        
Alabama   Partisan  Election     
Arkansas    Non-Partisan Election    In 2000 method was changed from 
partisan election 
Florida      Yes  In 1972 method was changed from 
partisan to non-partisan election; In 
1976 method was changed from non-
partisan election to present 
Georgia    Non-Partisan Election    In 1983 method was changed from 
partisan election 
Kentucky   Non-Partisan  Election     
Louisiana   Non-Partisan  Election  (could 
be considered Partisan) 
  In 1974 method was changed from  
partisan election; currently party 
affiliations on ballot but candidates do 
not solicit party contributions and 
primaries open to all candidates   24 
Mississippi    Non-Partisan Election    In 1994 method was changed from 
partisan election 
North Carolina    Partisan Election     
South Carolina  Legislature w/Nominating 
Commission 
    In 1996 method added nominating 
commission 
Tennessee      Yes  In 1994, method was changed from 
partisan election 
Virginia Legislature           
West Virginia    Partisan Election     
Region 6        
Arizona      Yes  In 1974 method was changed from non-
partisan election 
New Mexico    Partisan Election w/Retention 
Election for Subsequent Terms 
  In 1988 method was changed from 
partisan election 
Oklahoma     Yes   
Texas    Partisan Election       
Region 7        
Colorado     Yes   
Idaho   Non-Partisan  Election     
Montana   Non-Partisan  Election     
Utah     Yes   
Wyoming      Yes  In 1972 method was changed from non-
partisan election 
Region 8        
California     Governor  Appointment 
w/Retention Election 
 
Nevada   Non-Partisan  Election     
Oregon   Non-Partisan  Election     
Washington   Non-Partisan  Election     
 
Note:  The information collected for this data came from public documents from cite.  This 
document was published in 1970, 1974, 1980, 1987, 1993, and 1998.  Information for 2000 is 
found in the American Judicature Society’s Judicial Selection in the States: Appellate and 
General Jurisdiction Courts (1986, updated December 2000).  These sources were used to 
identify changes in judicial selection methods and then the website, 
http://www.ajs.org/js/select.htm, and state law library websites were used to identify the specific 
years the methods were changed.     25 
Table 2: First Year of Enactment of State Legislation on Employment Discrimination 
Applicable to Private Employers 
State Race  Sex  Age  Disability 
Region 1        
Connecticut 1973  1973  1973  1973 
Maine 1971  1973  1971  1974 
Massachusetts 1972  1972  1972  1972 
New Hampshire  1971  1971  1971  1975 
Rhode Island  1971  1971  1971  1973 
Vermont 1971  1971  1981  1974 
Region 2        
Delaware 1971  1971  1971  1988 
Maryland 1970  1970  1970  1974 
New Jersey  1970  1970  1970  1972 
New York  1971  1971  1971  1974 
Pennsylvania  Before 1970  Before 1970  Before 1970  No Statute 
Region 3        
Illinois 1971  1971  1971  1975 
Indiana 1971 1971  1971  1975 
Michigan 1972  1972  1972  1976 
Ohio 1973  1973  1978  1976 
Wisconsin 1974  1974 1974 1976 
Region 4        
Iowa 1970  1970  1972  1970 
Kansas 1970 1970  1983  1974 
Minnesota Before  1970  Before  1970  1977 1973 
Missouri 1978  1978  1986  1978 
Nebraska 1972  1972 1972  1973 
North Dakota  1979  1979  1979  1983 
South Dakota  1972  1972  No Statute  1986 
Region 5        
Alabama  No Statute  No Statute  1997  No Statute 
Arkansas 1993  1993  No  Statute  1993 
Florida 1977  1977  1977  1974 
Georgia No  Statute  No  Statute  1971  1981 
Kentucky 1972  1972  1972  1976 
Louisiana 1983  1983  1978  1980 
Mississippi  No Statute  No Statute  No Statute  1974 
North Carolina  1977  1977  1977  1977 
South Carolina  1979  1979  1979  1983 
Tennessee 1978  1978  1980  1987 
Virginia 1987 1987  1995  1975 
West Virginia  1971  1971  1971  1981 
Region 6        
Arizona 1974 1974  1980  1985 
New Mexico  Before 1970  Before 1970  Before 1970  1973 
Oklahoma 1973  1973 1985 1981 
Texas 1983  1983  1983  1975 
Region 7        
Colorado  Before 1970  Before 1970  Before 1970  1975 
Idaho  Before 1970  Before 1970  Before 1970  No Statute 
Montana 1971  1971  1974  1974 
Utah 1975  1975  1975  1979 
Wyoming 1979  1979  1984  1985 
Region 8        
California 1970  1970  1970  1973 
Nevada 1973 1973  1973  1973 
Oregon  Before 1970  Before 1970  Before 1970  1973 
Washington 1971  1971  1971  1973 
 
Note: Some states had statutes that were more policy statements than enforceable legislation.  The years provided in 
this table reflect statutes that were enacted with the intent of providing individuals with enforceable rights.   
Information on the state statutes was gathered from several sources:  first, to the best we could, we traced the 
legislation using copies of the current and past statutes.  Second, we relied on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Monthly Labor Review (all years).     26 
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Discrimination Charges Filed 
 
  All States  Elected Judge States  Hybrid Judge States  Appointed Judge States 
Total Charges         
  Mean  2274.4  2468.7  2599.4  1444.4 
    S.D.  (2609.9)  (2598.4)  (2997.1)  (1825.8) 
  Mean/100,000 Population  42.5  43.7  48.8  32.2 
    S.D.  (21.5)  (21.5)  (21.4)  (17.5) 
  # of Observations  1344  656  384  304 
Charges based on Black         
  Mean  832.6  1010.1  845.8  433.0 
    S.D.  (925.8)  (1014.9)  (895.6)  (574.4) 
  Mean/100,000 Population  14.3  16.5  15.0  8.7 
    S.D.  (10.8)  (11.6)  (10.1)  (7.6) 
  # of Observations  1344  656  384  304 
Charges based on Female         
  Mean  587.3  613.2  716.7  367.8 
    S.D.  (669.9)  (617.0)  (843.6)  (442.3) 
  Mean/100,000 Population  11.8  11.6  14.0  9.4 
    S.D.  (5.3)  (5.2)  (5.2)  (4.5) 
  # of Observations  1344  656  384  304 
Charges based on Age         
  Mean  513.3  550.4  570.2  362.7 
    S.D.  (572.1)  (586.5)  (623.2)  (432.0) 
  Mean/100,000 Population  9.6  9.5  11.2  7.8 
    S.D.  (5.4)  (5.0)  (6.3)  (3.8) 
  # of Observations  1008  478  299  231 
Charges based on Disability         
  Mean  638.4  661.7  741.2  453.4 
    S.D.  (619.3)  (601.3)  (723.9)  (444.9) 
  Mean/100,000 Population  12.1  11.3  14.1  11.1 
    S.D.  (4.4)  (3.7)  (4.9)  (4.3) 
  # of Observations  384  178  118  88 
Note:  These are the average number of employment discrimination charges filed per state, per year.  Charge data 
are from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.  For any given charge there may be more than one type 
of discrimination claim alleged. 
 
Table 4:  Summary Statistics  
for State Level Economic and Demographic Measures 
 
Measure  Mean S.D. 
% Employed in Service Sector  24.87  5.32 
% Employed in Financial Sector  7.02  1.46 
% Employed in Durable Manufacturing Sector  8.62  4.07 
% Employed in Non-Durable Manufacturing Sector  6.31  3.37 
Real Per Capita Income (Per 1000, 1996 Base Year)  132.33  24.42 
Unemployment Rate (*100)  6.11  2.11 
State Population  5006296  5240564 
% of Population 45_59 (*100)  15.29  1.55 
% of Population 60_64 (*100)  4.23  0.46 
% of Population 65 + (*100)  11.94  1.97 
% of Population Black (*100)  10.78  9.12 
Note: These statistics are based on per state, per year measures for the sample period.   27 
Table 5:  Analysis of Total Charges of Employment Discrimination 
Dependent Variable: Total Charges Per Capita  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
          
=1 if Appointed  -26.509 -25.492 -19.619 -23.669 -25.796 
  (3.505) (3.155) (3.062) (3.938) (4.126) 
Real Per Capita Income (per $1000)  0.175  0.138  0.471  1.507 1.558 
  (0.417) (0.392) (0.387) (0.470) (0.461) 
Real Per Capita Income Squared  -1.152E-04  2.167E-04  -7.840E-04  -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment Rate  1.453  1.731  2.115  0.648 0.709 
  (0.889) (0.731) (0.681) (0.634) (0.591) 
% of Employed in Service Sector  0.892  1.042  0.946  1.433 1.276 
  (0.406) (0.388) (0.369) (1.208) (1.095) 
% of Employed in Financial Sector  3.144 2.555 1.439 0.158 0.194 
  (1.232) (1.148) (1.139) (0.710) (0.780) 
% of Employed in Durable Manufacturing Sector  0.357  0.307  0.228  1.696 1.635 
  (0.566) (0.485) (0.392) (0.551) (0.492) 
% of Employed in Non-Durable Manufacturing Sector  0.972 0.891 0.732  0.659 0.752 
  (0.576) (0.503) (0.485) (0.333) (0.377) 
State Population (per million)  -1.364  -1.449 -2.119 -5.702 -5.785 
  (0.709) (0.688) (0.819) (0.820) (0.761) 
State Population Squared  0.020  0.027  0.053  0.207 0.216 
  (0.024) (0.022) (0.026) (0.040) (0.035) 
% of Population between 45 and 59  4.069 3.971 2.671 2.003 1.890 
  (2.186) (2.032) (1.843) (1.565) (1.587) 
% of Population between 60 and 64  -5.943  -5.565  -3.689  -8.114  -7.369 
  (7.220) (6.904) (6.609) (4.265) (4.430) 
% of Population 65 and Older  1.616  -0.799  -0.449  1.369  1.149 
  (1.791) (1.574) (1.612) (0.720) (0.920) 
% of Population Black  1.009 0.914 0.863 1.084 1.077 
  (0.196) (0.191) (0.204) (0.090) (0.086) 
=1 if race statute    -5.639  -7.243  -3.926 -3.545 
    (4.429) (4.021) (3.317) (3.103) 
=1 if age statute    3.653  4.564  0.634  -0.312 
    (4.253) (3.549) (2.250) (2.606) 
=1 if disability statute    1.752  3.594  -1.473  -1.209 
    (2.402) (2.759) (2.021) (2.044) 
=1 if no mandatory retirement    -4.913  -6.445  0.469 1.108 
    (2.931) (2.638) (2.917) (3.258) 
=1 if procedural change in last 3 years    -6.134 -5.715 -1.184 -1.048 
    (1.964) (1.776) (1.537) (1.615) 
=1 if broad state statute    -5.444 -4.794 -9.327 -9.604 
    (2.359) (2.076) (2.658) (2.563) 
No Second Level Appellate Court      -10.395  -3.682  -3.192 
      (3.463) (1.757) (2.023) 
Judge's Real Salary      -0.111     
     (0.101)     
Judge Serves for Life      -8.827    
     (3.301)     
region==     5.0000        8.161 8.518 
       (2.829)  (3.210) 
Fixed effects  Region*Year  Region*Year  Region*Year  Region, Year  Region, Year 
Instrument Variables Specification  No  No  No  No  Yes 
Observations 1344  1344  1344  476  476 
R-squared  0.6806 0.6415  0.729  0.8178 0.7965 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses ; standard errors computed using cluster command, clustering on state 
identifier.  Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at a p-value of <0.01.  Coefficients in bold and italicized 
are statistically significant at a p-value of <0.05. Coefficients italicized are statistically significant at a p-value of 
<0.10.  The p-value on the over-identification test for the IV specification is 0.108.   28 
Table 6: Analysis of Race-Based Discrimination Charges (Black Only) 
Dependent Variable: Total Race Charges Per Capita  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
       
=1 if Appointed  -15.231 -14.796 -12.989 -14.498 -20.295 
  (2.321) (1.862) (1.934) (2.359) (3.875) 
Real Per Capita Income (per $1000)  0.329  0.257  0.347  0.728  0.867 
  (0.189) (0.181) (0.188) (0.320) (0.279) 
Real Per Capita Income Squared  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment Rate  0.609  0.750 0.856 0.473  0.637 
  (0.403) (0.349) (0.346) (0.349) (0.338) 
% of Employed in Service Sector  0.234  0.308 0.261 0.691 0.264 
  (0.167) (0.140) (0.125) (0.758) (0.777) 
% of Employed in Financial Sector  0.771  0.638  0.328  0.161  0.260 
  (0.550) (0.540) (0.584) (0.356) (0.446) 
% of Employed in Durable Manufacturing Sector  0.561 0.502 0.458 1.161  0.995 
  (0.253) (0.212) (0.182) (0.406) (0.364) 
% of Employed in Non-Durable Manufacturing Sector  0.404  0.389  0.326  0.198  0.454 
  (0.336) (0.284) (0.292) (0.231) (0.309) 
State Population (per million)  -0.780  -0.724  -0.964  -3.886 -4.112 
  (0.474) (0.417) (0.478) (0.549) (0.433) 
State Population Squared  0.017  0.018  0.027  0.135 0.157 
  (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.023) (0.020) 
% of Population between 45 and 59  2.680 2.799 2.448 1.219 0.913 
  (0.900) (0.820) (0.832) (0.838) (1.134) 
% of Population between 60 and 64  -7.320 -7.021 -6.412 -4.625  -2.594 
  (3.217) (2.894) (2.777) (2.614) (2.780) 
% of Population 65 and Older  0.597  0.472  0.557  0.502  -0.098 
  (0.592) (0.534) (0.535) (0.372) (0.551) 
% of Population Black  0.883 0.793 0.775 0.771 0.752 
  (0.080) (0.075) (0.072) (0.067) (0.070) 
=1 if race statute    -2.941  -3.427  -3.556  -2.518 
    (2.185) (2.093) (1.890) (1.790) 
=1 if age statute    0.341  0.552  0.250  -2.328 
    (1.792) (1.614) (1.448) (1.747) 
=1 if disability statute    0.557  1.139  -1.020  -0.300 
    (1.183) (1.200) (1.211) (1.367) 
=1 if no mandatory retirement    -2.935 -3.384 0.933 2.674 
    (1.074) (1.009) (1.504) (1.916) 
=1 if procedural change in last 3 years    -1.296 -1.156 -0.627 -0.256 
    (0.667) (0.645) (0.834) (0.979) 
=1 if broad state statute    -2.969 -2.781 -3.461  -4.216 
    (0.939) (0.894) (1.877) (1.711) 
No Second Level Appellate Court      -3.541  -4.597  -3.260 
     (1.410) (1.460) (1.720) 
Judge's Real Salary      -0.029    
     (0.049)    
Judge Serves for Life      -2.309    
     (1.611)    
region==     5.0000       4.824 5.795 
      (1.846) (2.317) 
Fixed effects  Region*Year  Region*Year  Region*Year  Region, Year  Region, Year 
Instrument Variables Specification  No  No  No  No  Yes 
Observations 1344  1344  1344  476  476 
R-squared  0.7699 0.7969 0.8061 0.7804 0.7644 
See notes to Table 5.  The p-value on the over-identification test for the IV specification is 0.017.   29 
Table 7: Analysis of Sex-Based Discrimination Charges (Female Only) 
Dependent Variable: Total Gender Charges Per Capita  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
       
=1 if Appointed  -5.460 -5.119 -3.517 -5.423 -5.109 
  (1.009) (0.925) (0.777) (0.920) (1.155) 
Real Per Capita Income (per $1000)  0.054  0.042  0.157  0.436 0.428 
  (0.122) (0.112) (0.095) (0.118) (0.118) 
Real Per Capita Income Squared  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployment Rate  0.194  0.251  0.372  0.031 0.022 
  (0.218) (0.175) (0.164) (0.167) (0.166) 
% of Employed in Service Sector  0.110  0.142  0.176  0.047 0.071 
  (0.102) (0.097) (0.086) (0.340) (0.333) 
% of Employed in Financial Sector  0.703  0.552  0.064 -0.277 -0.282 
  (0.321) (0.301) (0.296) (0.215) (0.210) 
% of Employed in Durable Manufacturing Sector  -0.017  -0.033  0.013  0.248 0.257 
  (0.175) (0.160) (0.113) (0.125) (0.133) 
% of Employed in Non-Durable Manufacturing Sector  0.161  0.123  0.116  0.055  0.041 
  (0.150) (0.141) (0.120) (0.123) (0.132) 
State Population (per million)  -0.476  -0.500 -0.634 -1.494 -1.482 
  (0.194) (0.182) (0.196) (0.213) (0.203) 
State Population Squared  0.010  0.012  0.017  0.064 0.063 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) 
% of Population between 45 and 59  1.119  1.107 0.589 0.378 0.395 
  (0.600) (0.570) (0.528) (0.475) (0.486) 
% of Population between 60 and 64  0.594  0.686  1.180  0.682  0.572 
  (2.186) (2.119) (2.026) (1.171) (1.341) 
% of Population 65 and Older  -0.440  -0.437  -0.251  -0.007  0.026 
  (0.478) (0.449) (0.454) (0.185) (0.254) 
% of Population Black  0.162 0.143 0.135 0.213 0.214 
  (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.025) (0.027) 
=1 if race statute    -1.432  -1.966  -0.848 -0.905 
    (1.080) (0.969) (0.881) (0.884) 
=1 if age statute    1.251  1.733  0.858 0.998 
    (1.033) (0.809) (0.722) (0.900) 
=1 if disability statute    0.089  0.678  -0.768  -0.807 
    (0.741) (0.785) (0.645) (0.665) 
=1 if no mandatory retirement    -1.159  -1.664  0.180 0.086 
    (0.710) (0.657) (0.898) (0.925) 
=1 if procedural change in last 3 years    -1.880 -1.778 -0.584 -0.604 
    (0.655) (0.618) (0.678) (0.698) 
=1 if broad state statute    -1.873 -1.611 -3.521 -3.480 
    (0.701) (0.590) (0.622) (0.684) 
No Second Level Appellate Court      -1.735  -0.278 -0.350 
     (0.834)  (0.468)  (0.588) 
Judge's  Real  Salary     -0.007    
     (0.031)    
Judge Serves for Life      -4.077    
     (0.950)    
region==     5.0000        2.277 2.224 
       (0.864)  (0.785) 
Fixed effects  Region*Year  Region*Year  Region*Year  Region, Year  Region, Year 
Instrument Variables Specification  No  No  No  No  Yes 
Observations 1344  1344  1344  476  476 
R-squared  0.5635 0.6009 0.6273 0.7758 0.7756 
See Notes to Table 5.  The p-value on the over-identification test for the IV specification is 0.311. 
   30 
Table 8: Analysis of Age-Based Discrimination 
Dependent Variable: Total Age Charges Per Capita  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
       
=1 if Appointed  -4.667  -4.353 -2.975 -3.178 -0.383 
  (1.135) (1.098) (0.951) (0.472) (1.619) 
Real Per Capita Income (per $1000)  -0.054  -0.066  0.073  0.342  0.297 
  (0.150) (0.140) (0.132) (0.104) (0.125) 
Real Per Capita Income Squared  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployment Rate  0.266  0.308  0.510 0.462 0.400 
  (0.277) (0.238) (0.231) (0.195) (0.254) 
% of Employed in Service Sector  0.382  0.387 0.393 -0.451  -0.271 
  (0.125) (0.108) (0.115) (0.215) (0.281) 
% of Employed in Financial Sector  0.510  0.340  -0.085  -0.512 -0.593 
  (0.350) (0.336) (0.348) (0.215) (0.208) 
% of Employed in Durable Manufacturing Sector  0.048  0.030  0.004  -0.284  -0.151 
  (0.159) (0.149) (0.152) (0.110) (0.172) 
% of Employed in Non-Durable Manufacturing Sector  0.424  0.408 0.416 0.080 -0.108 
  (0.160) (0.142) (0.132) (0.119) (0.134) 
State Population (per million)  -0.028  -0.024  -0.181  0.060  0.173 
  (0.175) (0.161) (0.173) (0.239) (0.273) 
State Population Squared  -0.004  -0.004  0.001  0.006  -0.006 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) 
% of Population between 45 and 59  0.202  0.063  -0.515  2.113 2.291 
  (0.538) (0.530) (0.531) (0.540) (0.619) 
% of Population between 60 and 64  2.597  2.899  3.351 -3.237 -4.357 
  (1.709) (1.778) (1.651) (1.119) (1.233) 
% of Population 65 and Older  -0.770  -0.758  -0.566  0.726  1.067 
  (0.374) (0.377) (0.364) (0.250) (0.315) 
% of Population Black  0.017  0.003  -0.012  0.106 0.128 
  (0.056) (0.057) (0.058) (0.037) (0.046) 
=1 if race statute    -1.112  -1.785  0.288  -0.243 
    (1.332) (1.200) (0.441) (0.696) 
=1 if age statute    1.106  1.235  -0.128  1.490 
    (1.179) (0.921) (0.758) (1.155) 
=1 if disability statute    0.637  1.430  -0.246  -0.649 
    (1.241) (1.317) (0.491) (0.713) 
=1 if no mandatory retirement    -0.603  -1.022  0.090  -0.860 
    (0.745) (0.672) (0.765) (0.914) 
=1 if procedural change in last 3 years    -1.182  -0.902 -0.210 -0.564 
    (0.659) (0.589) (0.413) (0.542) 
=1 if broad state statute    -1.108  -0.906  -2.381 -2.099 
    (0.616) (0.569) (0.356) (0.572) 
No Second Level Appellate Court      -2.186  0.016 -0.301 
     (1.067)  (0.824)  (0.890) 
Judge's Real Salary      -0.030     
     (0.053)    
Judge Serves for Life      -3.397    
     (0.929)     
region== 5.0000        -2.126 -2.379 
       (0.797)  (0.832) 
Fixed effects  Region*Year  Region*Year  Region*Year  Region, Year  Region, Year 
Instrument Variables Specification  No  No  No  No  Yes 
Observations 1008  1008  1008  357  357 
R-squared  0.5002 0.5135 0.5378 0.7583 0.7314 
See Notes to Table 5.  The p-value on the over-identification test for the IV specification is 0.002.   31 
Table 9: Analysis of Disability-Based Discrimination 
Dependent Variable: Total Disability Charges Per Capita  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
       
=1 if Appointed  -4.714  -4.350  -1.928  -2.006 -5.006 
  (1.661) (1.827) (1.250) (0.907) (2.198) 
Real Per Capita Income (per $1000)  0.053  -0.042  0.500  -0.122 -0.059 
  (0.278) (0.303) (0.211) (0.190) (0.278) 
Real Per Capita Income Squared  -0.000  0.000  -0.001  0.000 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment Rate  0.191  0.324  0.863  0.052 -0.046 
  (0.585) (0.630) (0.423) (0.263) (0.306) 
% of Employed in Service Sector  0.209  0.223  -0.057  -0.033  -0.711 
  (0.209) (0.222) (0.170) (0.592) (0.904) 
% of Employed in Financial Sector  0.787  0.492 0.008 0.520 0.653 
  (0.451) (0.497) (0.459) (0.442) (0.548) 
% of Employed in Durable Manufacturing Sector  -0.070  -0.035  -0.496  0.285 -0.050 
  (0.363) (0.384) (0.242) (0.202) (0.312) 
% of Employed in Non-Durable Manufacturing Sector  0.940  0.864  0.566 0.009 0.182 
  (0.462) (0.476) (0.325) (0.507) (0.503) 
State Population (per million)  -0.122  -0.087  -0.717  -0.533 -0.030 
  (0.308) (0.332) (0.220) (0.757) (0.994) 
State Population Squared  0.000  -0.000  0.019  0.026 0.019 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.028) (0.034) 
% of Population between 45 and 59  1.430  0.999  0.282  1.040  0.769 
  (0.851) (0.958) (0.664) (0.922) (0.945) 
% of Population between 60 and 64  -1.354  0.598  2.555  -5.878  -6.910 
  (3.363) (4.322) (3.169) (3.921) (4.136) 
% of Population 65 and Older  0.330  0.061  0.288  0.836  0.768 
  (0.475) (0.534) (0.396) (0.551) (0.581) 
% of Population Black  0.030  0.016  -0.167  0.018 0.024 
  (0.067) (0.080) (0.069) (0.053) (0.069) 
=1 if race statute    0.138  -3.378 1.511 1.919 
    (2.212) (1.672) (0.686) (0.942) 
=1 if age statute    1.820  0.632  1.339  -2.535 
    (2.786) (1.371) (1.504) (3.499) 
=1 if disability statute    1.024  4.933  -0.507 0.342 
    (2.474) (2.472) (0.943) (1.404) 
=1 if no mandatory retirement    -1.706  -2.289  -1.425 2.326 
    (1.816) (1.209) (1.310) (3.436) 
=1 if procedural change in last 3 years    0.906  1.914  0.763  1.022 
    (1.099) (0.701) (0.556) (0.494) 
=1 if broad state statute    -1.387  -1.591 -3.048 -3.141 
    (1.117) (0.783) (1.148) (1.239) 
No Second Level Appellate Court      -9.298  -1.400 2.294 
     (1.611)  (1.783)  (3.391) 
Judge's Real Salary      0.014    
     (0.066)    
Judge Serves for Life      -5.055    
     (1.784)    
region==     5.0000       -1.353  -1.662 
      (2.309) (2.473) 
Fixed effects  Region*Year  Region*Year  Region*Year  Region, Year  Region, Year 
Instrument Variables Specification  No  No  No  No  Yes 
Observations  384 384 384 136 136 
R-squared  0.4081 0.4327 0.6459 0.7329 0.7053 
See Notes to Table 5.  The p-value on the over-identification test for the IV specification is 0.000. 
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Table 10: Analysis of Selection v. Incentive Effects of Judicial Appointment 
Dependent Variable  Total  Total  Race  Race  Gender  Gender  Age  Age  Disability  Disability 
  (1) (2) (5) (6) (7) (8) (3) (4) (9)  (10) 
Judge Initially Appointed  1.793  -17.624  -0.354  -12.175  0.998  -2.937  1.382  -2.135  0.709 -1.507 
  (3.455) (3.156) (1.844) (2.163) (0.808) (0.746) (0.812) (0.816) (0.879)  (1.163) 
=1 if Retention Election Used    24.822    15.111    5.030    4.524    3.102 
   (3.655)  (1.718)  (0.928)  (1.135)   (1.305) 
Real  Per  Capita  Income  (per  $1000)  0.442 0.223 0.379 0.246 0.130 0.085 0.063 -0.011 0.515  0.381 
  (0.420) (0.359) (0.234) (0.196) (0.101) (0.094) (0.138) (0.130) (0.209)  (0.193) 
Real  Per  Capita  Income  Squared  -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000  0.000 -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Unemployment Rate  2.313 2.438 0.912  0.988  0.440  0.466 0.668 0.637 1.029 0.995 
  (0.678) (0.618) (0.364) (0.332) (0.173) (0.162) (0.215) (0.194) (0.434)  (0.411) 
% of Employed in Service Sector  1.111 0.955 0.360 0.264 0.210 0.178 0.434 0.411 -0.022 -0.000 
  (0.376) (0.320) (0.144) (0.118) (0.083) (0.070) (0.108) (0.097) (0.174)  (0.167) 
% of Employed in Financial Sector  -0.104  1.409  -0.605  0.316  -0.251  0.055  -0.406  -0.080  -0.236  0.022 
  (1.317) (1.217) (0.645) (0.605) (0.316) (0.304) (0.378) (0.355) (0.478)  (0.464) 
% of Employed in Durable Manufacturing Sector  0.600  0.103  0.710  0.407  0.077 -0.024 0.063 -0.038 -0.448  -0.544 
  (0.412) (0.333) (0.192) (0.162) (0.108) (0.089) (0.151) (0.142) (0.241)  (0.215) 
% of Employed in Non-Durable Manufacturing Sector  -0.094  0.865  -0.203 0.381 -0.039 0.155 0.312  0.511  0.541  0.773 
  (0.606) (0.446) (0.408) (0.285) (0.134) (0.104) (0.124) (0.120) (0.294)  (0.315) 
State Population (per million)  -1.766  -1.496 -0.874 -0.710 -0.508 -0.453 -0.024 0.032 -0.636 -0.539 
  (0.985) (0.936) (0.550) (0.503) (0.226) (0.217) (0.221) (0.216) (0.250)  (0.260) 
State  Population  Squared  0.043 0.028 0.026 0.017 0.012 0.009 -0.004  -0.007 0.016  0.012 
  (0.032) (0.030) (0.017) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)  (0.008) 
% of Population between 45 and 59  1.954  2.480  2.050  2.370  0.427  0.534 -0.697 -0.474 -0.041  0.418 
  (2.061) (1.747) (1.044) (0.760) (0.555) (0.524) (0.534) (0.500) (0.717)  (0.641) 
% of Population between 60 and 64  -4.019  -1.002  -7.153  -5.316  1.350 1.962 3.299  3.681  2.835 1.801 
  (7.585) (6.251) (3.926) (2.668) (2.126) (1.934) (1.698) (1.650) (3.291)  (3.055) 
% of Population 65 and Older  0.400  -1.331  1.251  0.197 -0.157 -0.507 -0.480 -0.786  0.312 0.243 
  (1.708) (1.500) (0.743) (0.530) (0.460) (0.435) (0.379) (0.385) (0.403)  (0.382) 
% of Population Black  0.904 0.759 0.821 0.732 0.134 0.104 -0.018 -0.046 -0.182 -0.176 
  (0.251) (0.191) (0.129) (0.064) (0.058) (0.050) (0.055) (0.052) (0.064)  (0.065) 
=1 if race statute  -10.732  -9.365 -5.125 -4.293 -2.860  -2.583 -2.992 -2.639 -4.215  -3.476 
  (4.033) (3.607) (2.340) (1.968) (1.028) (0.890) (1.311) (1.245) (1.678)  (1.588) 
=1 if age statute  9.554  4.847  3.534  0.668  2.769  1.815  2.288  1.349 0.983  0.226 
  (3.281) (3.485) (1.777) (1.659) (0.661) (0.763) (0.761) (0.926) (1.238)  (1.315) 
=1  if  disability  statute  1.667 2.340 0.218 0.627 0.177 0.313 0.714 0.790 4.417 3.906 
  (3.053) (2.357) (1.447) (1.157) (0.774) (0.642) (1.252) (1.066) (2.522)  (2.281) 
=1 if no mandatory retirement  -8.624  -5.136  -4.974 -2.850 -1.990 -1.283 -1.215 -0.569  -2.543  -1.915 
  (2.503) (2.176) (1.177) (0.875) (0.564) (0.551) (0.592) (0.610) (1.034)  (1.106) 
=1 if procedural change in last 3 years  -5.048 -5.283 -0.837 -0.980 -1.605 -1.652 -0.704 -0.580 1.944  2.147 
  (1.746) (1.736) (0.693) (0.603) (0.595) (0.600) (0.529) (0.515) (0.760)  (0.684) 
=1 if broad state statute  -3.503  -3.952 -2.164 -2.437  -1.275 -1.366 -0.610 -0.604 -1.610  -1.383 
  (2.348) (1.981) (1.014) (0.867) (0.641) (0.586) (0.601) (0.541) (0.802)  (0.798) 
No Second Level Appellate Court  -13.497  -9.010 -5.708 -2.976 -2.242  -1.333  -2.323  -1.698  -9.184 -8.385 
  (3.796) (3.553) (1.871) (1.415) (0.862) (0.822) (1.035) (0.994) (1.562)  (1.691) 
Judge's  Real  Salary  -0.159 -0.109 -0.059 -0.028 -0.017 -0.006 -0.055 -0.033 -0.024  -0.007 
  (0.104) (0.098) (0.051) (0.050) (0.029) (0.030) (0.052) (0.052) (0.065)  (0.063) 
Judge Serves for Life  -14.060 -8.117  -5.637  -2.019  -5.074 -3.870 -4.318 -3.209 -5.770  -4.925 
  (4.397) (3.108) (2.009) (1.462) (1.204) (0.855) (1.134) (1.008) (1.900)  (1.759) 
Observations  1344 1344 1344 1344 1344 1344 1008 1008  384  384 
R-squared  0.70  0.74  0.7572 0.8131 0.6164 0.6421  0.53  0.55  0.6419  0.6544 
All regressions include Region*Year effects.  See Notes to Table 5. 